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ABSTRACT: In my 2009 book A Theory of Musical Narrative, I argued that narrativity in music can 
be productively understood according to the principle of transvaluation as defined by the American 
semiotician James Jakob Liszka. An important aspect of this principle — and hence of musical narra­
tive — is what Liszka describes as “the teleology of the sign user”: that is to say, the critical role played 
by the interpreter’s cognitive, cultural, and ideological perspective in formulating and presenting an 
interpretation. When this role is considered at all, it is frequently confined to a general, cautionary 
usage wherein the notion of a single, “correct” narrative interpretation of a work is repudiated and 
a sensitivity to context encouraged. In this chapter, I attempt to move beyond this general usage to 
consider ways in which it might be more fully characterized and formalized. To that end, I consider 
certain interpretive perspectives that might be characterized as possessing a cognitive (as opposed 
to a situational or cultural) component and understood within a framework of binary oppositions. 
In particular, I call attention to the fundamental formative roles that such perspectives can play 
in shaping and directing interpretive details. For example, the perception of — and hermeneutic 
engagement with — patterns deemed to be of narrative significance can arise either from a bounded 
(or centripetal) perspective, in which case the interpretive details tend to reinforce one another, 
circling around a relatively unified and coherent narrative, or they can arise from an unbounded 
(or centrifugal) perspective, in which case the interpretive details tend to push outward, suggesting 
the possibility of other non-selected yet viable alternative narratives. These and other binary for­
mulations to be discussed are applied to musical narratives but also have implications for narrative 
interpretation in general.
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In my 2009 book A  Theory o f Musical Narrative, I took up three 
primary tasks. First, I strove to articulate a definition of narrative general enough 
to encompass the wide variety of media — literature, music, cinema, and so on — 
within which it might operate, while also being attentive to the specific and unique 
character that music narrative possesses. To this end, I drew upon the American 
semiotician James Jakob Liszka’s term transvaluation, employed in his 1989 
book The Semiotic of Myth and about which I will have more to discuss below. 
Second, I indicated how this definition might be translated into a flexible working 
model for the analysis of musical narrative, a model that is sensitive to multiple 
modalities and hierarchical levels of signification and that recognizes fundamental 
archetypal variations at the global level — those represented by Northrop Frye’s 
categories of romance, tragedy, irony, and comedy. Finally, I demonstrated that 
this semiotically oriented model of narrative interpretation could accommodate
an eclectic range of analytical approaches, represented in the book by — among 
others — Robert S. Hatten, Vera Micznik, Eero Tarasti, and myself.
Returning to the definition of narrative as transvaluation, I follow Liszka’s 
understanding of the latter as a rule-like semiosis which revaluates the perceived, 
imagined, or conceived markedness and rank relations of a referent as delimited 
by the rank and markedness relations of the system of the signans and the teleol­
ogy of the sign user.1
In more informal terms, the result of transvaluation is to effect a significant 
change in a work’s manifested hierarchy of values as articulated in terms of its 
markedness and rank relations, to subject this hierarchy to crisis and track the 
manner in which that crisis is resolved or fails to resolve.2
I will not retread the same ground in this present context, and I refer those 
interested in the larger argument to my earlier research. Instead, I focus here on 
the implications of the last clause in Liszka’s definition — namely, that narrative 
transvaluation is delimited by “the teleology of the sign user.” In its most basic 
sense, this clause points to the irreducible role of the listener or interpreter in 
determining how a transvaluation is to be observed, interpreted, and articulated.
Certain corollary conclusions immediately suggest themselves, appearing over 
and over in the hermeneutic and narrative literature in various forms. One — a kind 
of narrative Schrodinger’s Cat equivalent — is that no single privileged interpreta­
tion of a work can exist independently of an observer. Interpretation always mani­
fests itself through the lens of that observer, with all the socio-cultural, experiential, 
rhetorical, and cognitive refractions of the image that such a lens would create.
A second conclusion to be drawn is that a particular interpretation might be 
aligned with, at some variance with, or in opposition to, an established social or 
disciplinary consensus about how a work is to be interpreted. It thus allows for 
the possibility of interrogating the conventions or assumptions that underlie that 
consensus, as — for example — Susan McClary has done with respect to patriarchal 
analytical paradigms.3 Similarly, Michael L. Klein, in his book Intertextuality in 
Western A rt Music (2005), has questioned the necessity of positing a causal chain 
of influence between one work and another in cases where an intertextual link is 
to be maintained.
A third conclusion is that the signification system of any work in question is 
sufficiently complex and multifaceted — with many potentially significatory features
1 James Jakob Liszka, The Semiotic of Myth: A Critical Study of the Symbol (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1989), 71.
2 Ibid., 15.
3 Susan McClary, “The Blasphemy of Talking Politics during a Bach Year,” in Music and 
Society: The Politics o f Composition, Performance, and Reception, ed. Susan McClary and 
Richard Leppart (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1987), 13-62.
to observe and select and from which to form patterns — that no two individuals 
would be likely to interpret that work along the same lines.
Although these conclusions have been — and will continue to be — drawn, 
our attentiveness to the issue of interpretive teleology is in danger of remaining at 
the level of the cautionary tale or the permission slip. On the one hand, we warn 
ourselves not to take our interpretation as fixed, final, and authoritative. On the 
other hand, we too easily overestimate the degree to which our interpretations are 
really free and unfettered, ignoring the constraints within which our ideas and 
insights are necessarily situated.
But what are these constraints? And how, in light of our general semiotic en­
terprise, might they be productively formalized and folded in to our interpretive 
system for consideration? Such constraints are in fact manifold. For example, 
Kevin Korsyn, in his book Decentering Music (2003) has described how disci­
plinary bailiwicks erect barriers of allegiance and identity that can discourage 
the articulation or dissemination of divergent viewpoints. These viewpoints are 
consequently assimilated or rejected, rendering their arguments two-dimensional 
to deflect attention from their “aberrant” features.4
Randall Collins, in The Sociology of Philosophies (2005) has likewise chal­
lenged our unspoken assumptions that ideas emerge — like Athena — fully-formed 
from the mind of the creative scholar, or that, conversely, our ideas are somehow 
the product of an amorphous entity like “culture.” Instead, he points to the neces­
sary synergistic interactions of teacher and pupil and to the creative engagements 
and disengagements of one’s local intellectual circle and of rival contemporary 
circles to spearhead innovation and change. In other words, Collins points to so­
ciological and disciplinary constraints on interpretation, constraints that are no 
less real for being frequently unrecognized and unacknowledged.
I would like to focus on a different constraint, one that I believe to be the most 
determinative of all with respect to narrative interpretation, and that I would 
describe as a cognitive constraint — that is to say, the role played by our mental 
constitution and its temperamental, interactive, and functional variables in inflect­
ing the way we perceive musical data, observe signifying patterns and relationships, 
organize and categorize our perceptions, and articulate a spectrum of values, all 
aspects that are central to narrative interpretation.
One way to cast the cognitive constraint into sharper relief is to examine a dis­
puted text, a work about which competing narratives have been proposed. Such 
a disputed text is the opening theme of the Andante moderato movement of Gustav 
Mahler’s Symphony No. 6, shown in Example 1. At issue in this excerpt are certain 
unexpected features that push against a non-selected — but more conventional — 
musical syntax, including: 1) the intrusion of chromatic elements into the prevail­
4 Kevin Korsyn, Decentering Music: A Critique of Contemporary Musical Research (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 20.
ing major mode in measures 1 ,3-4 , and 6 -8 ,2 )  a hypermetric fluidity apparently 
concentrated in measures 4 -5  and 7 -8 , and 3) unusual fluctuations in the melodic 
and rhythmic parameters, particularly the abrupt upward leap to D5 in measure 7 
in combination with the out-of-sequence return of the dotted-half-to-quarter-note 
rhythmic motive from measure 4, and the stretched-out descent to the cadence 
in measures 8-10.
Example 1: Gustav Mahler, Symphony No. 6, Andante Moderato (iii), mm. 1-10
This theme, and the movement that it initiates, was the site of a dialogue in­
volving two analyses, the latter intended as a rebuttal to the former, published in 
2001 and 2005, respectively, by Warren Darcy and James Buhler. Interestingly, 
while the authors are in rough agreement about the critical salient details of the 
theme, the interpretive frameworks into which they put these details are quite at 
odds. To give the flavor of this dialogue, here are two quotations, the first by Darcy 
and the second by Buhler, in which they both respond to the unusual character 
of the theme:
Although in Eb major, the theme is shot through with minor-mode implications — the 
Neapolitan b2 in m. 1, the gb1 in m. 3, in m. 6, and so on. The theme peaks with a sense 
of anguish in m. 7 on a drawn-out leading tone suspended over a Neapolitan sixth chord. 
The ensuing cadential descent unfolds a new two-note motive that suggests the old 
topos of a musical sigh (or gasp). [...] The expressive impact of this theme lies [...] in 
its pronounced sense of musical strain as it labors to uphold its major-minor premise, 
labors to avoid collapsing into minor.5
Darcy’s analysis enacts a localized narrative reading of the passage in question, 
largely by following the established interpretive tradition at several levels: (1) the 
terminological (minor-mode implications, Neapolitan, leading tone, cadential
5 Warren Darcy, “Rotational Form, Teleological Genesis, and Fantasy Projection in the Slow 
Movement of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony,” 19th-Century Music 25 (2001), no 1, 58-9.
descent, and motive), (2) the hermeneutic (themes with expressive “peaks,” mo­
tives representing topoi, metaphors of strain and collapse, and a duality between 
tonal clarity and the musical forces that undermine it), and (3) the disciplinary 
(a Schenkerian sensitivity to mode mixture, and a concern for the work’s position 
within the Formenlehre tradition). By contrast, Buhler’s analysis seems to revel 
in novelty, in subverting traditional readings, in part through an appeal to the 
less-sanctioned disciplinary tradition of the Adornian critique:
There is nothing especially clear about the chord [in m. 7], above all with respect to 
its functionality, which has much the same sense of ambivalence as that of the Tristan 
chord. [...] The musical process gives itself over, assimilates itself, to the alien sound of 
radical otherness as it exists in itself, and demands nothing of it. [...] In bar 7 a break in 
the dialectic is staged before our ears, without, however, turning it into a crisis; there 
is less a sense of anguish than the sort of melancholic heartbreak felt when one thinks 
one might be unwelcome.6
One gets a sense in examining these quotations that we are learning as much 
about the analysts and their modes of perception and judgment as we are about 
the music. A complicating feature here — as I have mentioned above — is that the 
second quote was written as a response to the first; the second author is interpret­
ing both the musical event and the prior interpretation of that event. In light of 
this fact, we see that Buhler is reacting to what he perceives as too tight a weave in 
Darcy’s hermeneutic fabric: Buhler is resistant to the oppositional clarity of major 
vs. minor that Darcy sets up to raise the stakes of the interpretation.
Here the authors are disagreeing less about the salient musical features than 
about how one should react to them. Subsequent portions of Buhler’s rebuttal 
rehearse this same tension. He concurs with Darcy that the Andante is topically 
distant from surrounding movements, that the primary theme is unusually clo- 
sural, that the chromatic inflections, tonal shifts, and phrase asymmetries require 
explanation, and that the primary theme alternates with contrasting material in 
a rondo-like fashion. What sets the two analyses apart, instead, are the compet­
ing and often incommensurable cognitive strategies that are marshaled to explain 
these features.
How might one untangle these competing strategies? We might try to isolate 
interpretive decisions that reflect polar oppositions with respect to some parameter. 
Here, Buhler’s own rhetoric suggests two such oppositions. The first involves their 
respective responses to musical disjunctions:
The analysis [by Darcy] purchases its harmonic cogency by neutralizing the strange­
ness of the moment. The textual supplement of anguish is the only thing that alerts
6 James Buhler, “Theme, Thematic Process, and Variant Form in the Andante Moderato of 
Mahler’s Sixth Symphony,” in Perspectives on Gustav Mahler, ed. Jeremy Barham (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005), 278-80.
us that the shadow of something new and fantastic has fallen across the music here. 
[...] The clarity offered by the graph however is false to the extent that it demands, as 
a Schenkerian graph must, that the music conform to the normative tonal syntax of 
the cadence. [...] The graph therefore runs counter to the searching quality of the tonal 
expression here, which resists just the type of clear definition that the graph portrays. 
The musical process gives itself over, assimilates itself, to the alien sound of radical 
otherness as it exists in itself, and demands nothing of it, whereas for the sake of drawing 
out its coherent long line the graph does just the opposite, assimilating what is other by 
excising what it can and domesticating the rest through beams and slurs to the tonally 
rational world of all too clear auxiliary and passing motions.7
Buhler suggests that this is part of a larger pattern of conformance, through which 
non-normative musical elements are reduced away or exorcized, as when he cites 
as an empty convention Darcy’s position that the period form is used in the work:
The mark of the composing hand is consequently also the sound of authoritarian control: 
the arbitrary imposition of the period form from above deforms the material so as to 
contain its energies within the socially acceptable boundaries that the form prescribes.8
Similarly, with respect to the intrusion of the minor mode in the Andante, he 
argues that, for Darcy, “the alterations are understood as sites of resistance to 
minor, places where the tonal process often fends off a catastrophic collapse of 
the self into the other.”9
Buhler positions Darcy’s hermeneutic program — a major-mode tonal structure 
and a periodic Rondo-like formal structure struggling to ward off collapse into the 
other — as anxiety about that which is not normative or that does not conform. 
In its place, Buhler substitutes a program that foregrounds receptivity to multiple 
approaches, along with a resistance to fixed structures. Buhler understands the 
Andante as an “anti-Rondo,” in which the material derived from outside the main 
theme group receives greater attention. In so doing, he rhetorically highlights the 
foreign, intrusive elements in his interpretation in the service of an interpretive 
catholicity:
The anti-Rondo, with its rhetorical emphasis on the Abgesang rather than the theme, 
cherishes non-identity. Savouring the beauty of the fleeting sunset, it does not seek to 
assimilate the other, to capture it and hold it securely in place for the sake of identity, 
so much as assimilate itself to the other, leaving itself open and vulnerable for the sake 
of non-identity. Through this openness to what it cannot possess comes the sound of 
its profound humaneness.10
7 Ibid., 278-9
8 Ibid., 279.
9 Ibid., 280.
10 Ibid., 293.
Buhler continues this strategy up to the very end of the article, where he opens out 
Darcy’s “collapsing self’ narrative into a larger frame.
Mahler’s Andante constructs a dream world; its idyll dreams of happiness, the accept­
ance and even cherishing of non-identity. But it also knows the danger of sentimental 
enchantment. Disavowing identity, his dream turns self-critical and breaches the sen­
timental subject idealistically built on it, but without crisis and without disowning 
the world.11
Here Buhler appears to remake Mahler’s music in his own image — but this is of 
course what Darcy, or any of us, does in the act of interpretation. I am not con­
cerned here with whether one reading or another is more correct, or even more 
rhetorically effective. Instead, I am calling attention to the impact of divergent 
cognitive strategies on the creation of divergent, yet equally coherent, interpreta­
tions. To summarize, we might describe this first binary distinction as representing 
a perceptual preference for either bounded or unbounded pattern  articulation. 
In Darcy’s case, a bounded interpretive pattern lends a sharp, focused coherence 
to the analysis and the sense of a singular vision articulated; in Buhler’s case, an 
unbounded interpretive pattern attempts to combine the relative complexity of an 
open system with the rhetorical virtuosity of following a contingent thread — in 
the moment, as it were.
A second binarism to be inferred from Buhler’s engagement with Darcy’s ideas 
concerns the different ways they organize musical material and the place of that 
organization in their larger discourses. Darcy rhetorically employs a Schenkerian 
meta-language that allows him to position his analyses as empirical tests, observa­
tions that might be validated and rechecked by other scholars who accept the same 
meta-language. He also legitimizes his results though an appeal to the privileged 
status of his methodology within the American musical-theoretical community. 
Buhler, though analogously situated with respect to an Adornian aesthetic, posi­
tions himself rhetorically as resistant to privileged methodologies and skeptical 
of orthodoxy. Buhler appears to be attempting to foreground an interpretive com­
plexity represented by his array of sources (including Arnold Schoenberg, Robert 
Hirschfield, and Constantin Floros) while also repositioning the perspective within 
which they should be viewed — the music’s “cherishing of non-identity.” This 
aesthetic of elegance-within-complexity is carried over into the meta-analytical 
domain in his use of the “anti-Rondo” principle to organize both the music and the 
discourse — the chapter, like the Andante movement itself, is made to involve the 
alternation of a conventional idea (the array of critical sources) with contrasting 
material (Buhler’s discussions of these sources), in which the latter overtake the 
primary role from the former.
11 Ibid.
We might characterize this second binarism as reflecting a preference either 
for sanctioned consensual systems or emerging idiosyncratic systems.
Before examining these binarisms in more detail, we can draw several other 
important conclusions from this brief comparison. First, there is a sense in which 
the various critical positions about the work in question, though subjectively in­
tegrated by the authors, are, to some degree, conceptually incommensurable. 
Second, as a consequence of this incommensurability, the authors are actually 
talking at cross-purposes, each presenting their own unique vision without estab­
lishing a genuine connection between them. Now it might be the case that a certain 
rhetorical bracketing and distancing from alternate approaches is necessary to 
establish any coherent interpretation at all. If this is so, then we cannot properly 
gauge the epistemological status of any narrative interpretation unless and until 
we understand the contribution played by cognitive constraints.
I would suggest that viewing interpretation through the lens of binarisms 
such as the two described above might help us to understand the variances that 
cognitive constraints introduce. In other words, beyond any contribution given by 
the medium to be analyzed, and beyond any traditional analytical or hermeneutic 
paradigms, the interpreter makes certain choices that actually have more to do 
with one’s preferred modes of perception and organization. These modes cannot 
be stripped away to establish objective “tru th” on the basis of an Archimedean 
point of stability, since that truth can only be constituted within the framework 
that it establishes.
Although we cannot set aside the cognitive component of interpretation, we 
can introduce a degree of productive empathy into the ways that it shapes our 
arguments and those of others. Indeed, a recognition of interpretive differences 
arising from distinct — but equally coherent — perspectives allows one to clarify 
where common ground exists, where improvements may be considered, and where 
differences may be encouraged to coexist. It is better, I believe, thus to approach 
an interpretation on its own terms before engaging further with it.
The question of cognitive constraints has become the focus of a growing degree 
of research in recent years from fields as distinct as neuroscience, phenomenol­
ogy, systems science, psychology, corporate training, and education. A particularly 
convergent and productive vein of research dates back 100 years to Carl Jung’s 
articulation of eight distinct cognitive functions, themselves inspired by Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s philosophy and William Jam es’s pragmatic approach to psychology. 
The systems scientist Dario Nardi has recently referred to these cognitive functions 
as representation systems that cohere on the basis of distinct functional principles. 
Nardi likens the distinct characteristics of these systems to those that give rise to 
different spoken languages — for example, the Finnish language, with its alpha­
betic characters that combine to form morphological units, differs in character 
from Chinese, with its larger number of characters that contain visual nuances 
not applicable to alphabetic characters. Both languages facilitate communication,
but employ different strategies to do so, to the extent that certain concepts can be 
expressed in Finnish that cannot be expressed in Chinese, and vice-versa.12
Recent approaches to these cognitive functions have focused on 1) phenom­
enological definitions, 2) their neuroscientific relationships to patterns of brain 
function, and 3) issues of systematization and application. I’d like to touch on these 
three areas in the present context of narrative interpretation to construct certain 
productive avenues of approach to the teleology of the sign user. I’ll present a much 
larger set of binarisms that emerge from this research toward the end of this study, 
but let’s return first to one distinction we’ve already exemplified — bounded vs. 
unbounded pattern articulation — in order to illustrate the phenomenological and 
neuroscience research.
Bounded vs. unbounded pattern articulation would appear to engage with 
a similar distinction made by Jung with respect to his cognitive functions Intro­
verted and Extraverted Intuition. Nardi describes these functions, respectively, 
as “transforming with a metaperspective’13 and “exploring emerging patterns.”14 
Nardi and other researches like Linda V. Berens have attempted to provide sys­
tematically rigorous definitions and phenomenologically accurate descriptions 
of these functions, a task complicated by the fact that (1) their qualities must 
be abstracted from any particular situation in which they are employed; (2) one 
must filter out any characteristics that result from the use of multiple functions in 
combination; and (3) one must distinguish between the qualities of each function 
that emerge from comfortable use and those that are the product of strain, anxiety 
or unfamiliarity. Here, for example, is Nardi’s description of introverted intuition 
(abbreviated as Ni):
At the core of introverted Intuiting is a metaperspective — the highest level or the 
most flexible frame of mind or form of behavior that each of us currently has access to 
[...]. With understanding we can shift between perspectives at will, each one giving us 
insights and energizing us with a different “way to be” to solve otherwise intractable 
problems [...]. The most powerful metaperspectives result in a transformation, synthe­
sis, or paradigm shift. All that was confusing or waiting on the edge of our mind is now 
accessible from a single vantage point.15
Notice the extent to which the bounding metaperspective shapes the working of 
this function, giving it a centripetal character — any subsequent interpretive work 
results from and coheres on the basis of the established boundaries. By contrast, 
here is one definition of extraverted intuition (abbreviated as Ne):
12 Dario Nardi, 8 Keys to Self-Leadership: From Awareness to Action (Huntington Beach, 
CA: Unite Business Press [Telos Publications], 2005), 190-2.
13 Ibid., 71.
14 Ibid., 55.
15 Ibid., 73-5.
Extraverted intuiting involves noticing hidden meanings and interpreting them, often 
entertaining a wealth of possible interpretations from just one idea or interpreting what 
someone’s behavior really means. It also involves seeing things “as if,” with various pos­
sible representations of reality. Using this process, we can juggle many different ideas, 
thoughts, beliefs, and meanings in our mind at once with the possibility that they are 
all true [...]. Thus a strategy or concept often emerges from the here-and-now interac­
tions, not appearing as a whole beforehand. Using this process we can [...] appreciate 
brainstorming and trust what emerges, enjoying imaginative play with scenarios and 
combining possibilities, using a kind of cross-contextual thinking.16
In contrast to the previous definition, there is an unbounded, centrifugal quality 
to this function. Because the perspective is not predetermined at the start, the fo­
cus shifts from articulating and refining the whole to finding one of many threads 
through a network of data.
To get a better sense of how these functions can affect interpretation, here are 
two phenomenological, “from-the-inside,” descriptions of the creative process 
taken from interviews I conducted with two music scholars reflecting on their own 
writing processes. Here is one (anonymous) contribution (let’s call him /her “A”), 
one in which I see the undeniable influence of unbounded pattern articulation 
(from Jung’s extraverted intuition, or Ne):
I think of any complex thought or system of related thoughts as a three-dimensional 
matrix [...] with [...] links all multiply connected to one another. The problem that 
I have is that writing is necessarily linear — you start at the beginning and move in 
a straight line until you hit the end. So you have to impose a kind of flattening distor­
tion onto thought — to render something three-dimensional in two dimensions. This 
stresses me out, because, in my mental image of thought as a matrix, no one point is 
privileged as the “start.” Where does a thought start — well, what’s the first synapse 
in the brain? What’s the first marshmallow in a jell-o mold? Know what I mean? It’s 
a nonsensical question, and yet we force ourselves to ask it by virtue of the fact that we 
cannot communicate verbally or in written form without linearity, with its beginnings 
and endings [...]. Anyway, on big tasks, I am sometimes a bit paralyzed by the aware­
ness that I whatever place I start at is kind of random. But then again, I don’t want to 
overstate the randomness, because the starting-point is dictated by the exigencies of the 
moment: the point you wish to convey most strongly, how you wish to frame the issue 
for whatever conceptual purpose. The trick then is that you have to be very aware of 
your own purposes, and aware of your audience and what might resonate most strongly 
with them. But the thing is: I am always aware that the same sub-topic within a complex 
topic can play multiple roles (as supporting evidence, as the point of a paper or chap­
ter, as a footnote) depending on the exigencies of the writing situation. This leads me
16 Linda V. Berens, Dario Nardi, Understanding Yourself and Others, An Introduction to 
the Personality Type Code (Huntington Beach, CA: Telos Publications, 2004), 7.
to a certain dissatisfaction with conventional writing manuals, which assume a more 
orderly progression than I feel I can manage. I like to feel that I’m keeping my options 
open — I don’t work from outlines. I don’t know what’s important when I start! I have 
some ideas, but these are always susceptible to revision as I make more discoveries or 
write things down and then the real argument gradually emerges. For me, research is 
a circular process, where you have an idea, research it, and in researching it develop 
new ideas based on contingencies.
Notice the way that A’s argument emerges from the placing together of many 
initially unconnected insights to articulate an emerging pattern. In another con­
text, A spoke of beginning a large project by pulling together dozens of short 
(500-3000 word) sketches and mini-essays on individual component sub-topics 
that were written over a couple of years. What is striking about A’s approach is its 
combination of topical extensity and a methodological open-endedness. In resist­
ing a linearization of method or insight, A is able to glean insights from unusual 
juxtapositions of material, applying them by analogy to other situations, and not 
circumscribing in advance the direction that that linking process will take. That 
so many of A’s remarks should constellate unbounded pattern articulation is not 
surprising, since they follow naturally from the core of a coherent representation 
system. Any one technique might be found in other circumstances, but taken to­
gether they strongly evoke this particular mode, evincing a predilection to focus 
attention on the interconnectedness and global relations among ideas across dif­
ferent contexts and domains.
By contrast, consider another interview subject — let’s call him or her “B.” Like 
A, B’s approach foregrounds abstract connections between multiple domains, but 
there are significant differences of motivation:
The metaphor I keep coming back to when I think about my own research is that of 
being at an optician’s office and trying on lots of different pairs of glasses — glasses 
with clear lenses, tinted lens, glare-proof lenses, colored lenses. I can see perfectly out 
of all of them, but my experience is totally different depending on what I’m looking 
through. I’m drawn to finding new ways to classify some aspect of musical language 
or thought, not so much for the categories themselves, but to call attention to the fact 
that one could look at the same phenomenon in so many different ways. I want to break 
the traditional molds, to open up a whole range of insights that people can use to go 
in completely new directions. I usually draw inspiration from reading — mainly from 
outside my field — and at first I just read “for fun,” as it were, not thinking of what I’m 
doing as preliminary research. Every once in awhile, I begin to feel a resonance with 
what I’m reading, and an idea starts to form, with lots of complex layers and directions. 
I almost always have a strong conviction that my insight is “right,” but my problem is to 
demonstrate it, to connect it up with reality. So then comes the hard work: confirming 
it and testing it in specific situations and considering as many objections to my idea 
as possible. If my model does not match up with “reality” in places, then I try to refine
my model to account for these problems. It’s like working with a huge tent that isn’t 
fixed down — it won’t do its job, it will blow away until there are lots and lots of ropes 
connecting it to the ground.
Although A and B have some qualities in common — a global focus and a tendency 
toward abstraction — there are significant differences. B’s comments suggest 
a second representation system, what I have called bounded pattern articulation 
(from Jung’s introverted intuiting, or Ni). The core of this mode — “transforming 
with a metaperspective” — emerges very clearly in the quoted excerpt. There is an 
emphasis on evoking new insights, not to solve a particular problem or task, but 
for its own sake, for the new vistas that emerge from placing some elements in 
relief and letting others move into the background. The deductive quality suggested 
by the mode’s name is clearly evident in the way B moves from idea to applica­
tion — a framework is laid over a domain, and then linked up with examples that 
give it depth. B’s language has a kind of metaphorical richness that reinforces the 
core — deeper meanings emerge through unexpected verbal connections. Unlike 
A, B does not allow the web of connections to spin out from moment-to-moment, 
but instead refers those moments continually back to the initial framework.”
We might speculate on potential misreadings that might arise between A and 
B due to their different functional priorities. To A, B might appear to be “cooking 
the books,” constraining speculation ahead of time to conform to an a priori frame­
work. On the other hand, B might find A’s approach unfocused and diffuse, lacking 
a sufficiently powerful unifying thread. I mention this to suggest the possibility 
that moments of misreading can arise from these clashes of function. Someone 
comfortable with unbounded patterns might be more accepting of analyses with 
frequent shifts of focus and direction than someone for whom this function is 
foreign or uncomfortable.
In addition to being representationally coherent as functional oppositions, 
recent social neuroscience research appears to have confirmed that this opposition 
has its basis in different configurations of brain functions. Experiments at Nardi’s 
social neuro-imaging lab at the University of California Los Angeles have yielded 
certain conclusions about the role of cognitive functions:17
1. Certain regions of the brain are employed by all subjects when performing 
a certain range of tasks.
2. Certain recurring patterns of brain-region activation can be correlated with 
particular cognitive functions like Ni or Ne.
3. Individual cognitive activity reveals that certain regions of the brain (or 
combinations thereof) are more easily activated by stimuli in certain individuals 
than in others.
4. Individual cognitive functions appear as first-default strategies for certain 
individuals, second-default strategies for others, and not at all frequently for oth­
17 Dario Nardi, Neuroscience of Personality ([PowerPoint slides], 2009), unpublished, 17.
ers. In other words, cognitive functions are employed by individuals according to 
a consistent hierarchy of preference and comfort level.
Returning to our binary opposition of unbounded vs. bounded pattern articu­
lation (Ne vs. Ni), we can find in Nardi’s research both a cognitive trace of such 
an opposition (expressed in terms of extraverted and introverted intuition) and 
distinct populations that prefer to employ one strategy over the other (and a further 
population that does not prefer either strategy to a significant degree).
So, with respect largely to individuals exhibiting a marked preference for it, 
unbounded pattern articulation manifests itself cognitively in several ways.18 First, 
it is activated by tasks involving what Nardi calls “trans-contextual thinking,” or 
the joining together of aspects of situations that appear unrelated. (Recall A’s 
penchant for stringing together disparate small sketches into a larger project.) 
Second, it engages a region of the brain (P4) located roughly in the center of the 
right posterior convexity that appears to be concerned with assessing the relative 
contributions of multiple but simultaneous factors. Again, recall A’s concern for not 
reducing away the complexity of the phenomena in question. Third, peak usage of 
this function is associated with a zig-zag-like accessing of multiple regions of the 
brain, as if sorting through numerous provisional solutions. Finally, it engages an 
additional region of the brain (F7) located on the outer edge of the left frontal lobe. 
This region contains so-called “mirror cells,” that adjust responses to the activity 
and behavior of others and that promote a kind of “as-if’ thinking that imagines 
one’s self in another’s place or situation. Here I would stress the contingency of the 
articulated pattern on a particular context, a point also touched upon by person A.
By contrast, bounded pattern articulation is associated with entirely different 
mental processes.19 Two regions of the brain in particular are activated in this 
context. The first is a region (T6) located on the outer edge of the right posterior 
convexity that is identified with making projections about future situations and 
outcomes, while the second (Fp2), located just right of center at the outer edge of 
the frontal lobe, is concerned with tracking one’s point of progress in a particular 
process. Here we observe both the meta-perspective reframing characteristic of 
person B and the necessity of a boundary within which to track progress. A more 
contextually contingent, unbounded approach would not allow a more precise 
fixing of progress along a path. Peak usage of this function thus associates with 
looking ahead to solve unforeseen problems. Unlike other functions, both kinds 
of pattern articulation call forth some response from all brain regions, perhaps 
because of the provisional, initially non-characterizable nature of such patterns, 
but bounded pattern articulation does not exhibit the zig-zag pattern characteristic 
of unbounded pattern articulation. Instead, there is a more leisurely accessing of
18 Dario Nardi, Neuroscience of Personality: Brain Savvy Insights for All Types of People 
(Los Angeles: Radiance House 2011), 98-9.
19 Ibid., 102-3.
multiple regions characteristic of holistic strategizing. Note that this configuration 
is less characterized by external contextual stimuli at the perceptual stage than it 
is, retrospectively, in the service of the future projection.
I have suggested that both phenomenological and neuroscientific evidence 
points to pragmatic and functional distinctions in human approaches to creative 
tasks like the interpretation of music or other narrative phenomena. I would also 
argue that these individual distinctions — when applied to any complex system 
of perceptual and systematic variables — lead to recognizable variances in the 
character of that interpretation. It is thus possible to imagine a more exhaustive 
and rigorous kind of “discourse analysis” the aim of which is to carefully untangle 
the impact of cognitive preferences.
In this current study I have limited myself to one or two binarisms in the inter­
est of exploring their implications in depth. But I would like to conclude by briefly 
touching upon the range of other such distinctions upon which we might call when 
undertaking the kind of discourse analysis that I envision. I have been drawn to 
a Jungian perspective on these issues because of its historically rich interpretive 
tradition, its dissemination through a wide range of disciplines in the social sciences, 
arts, and humanities, the cognitive support for its conclusions, and, perhaps most 
importantly, the formative incorporation of binary oppositions into its structure 
and its consequent potential for systematic articulation into such binarisms.
While I do not wish to overload the present study with excessive detail, a sum­
mary of certain features of Jungian type theory, shown in Figure 1, is in order here.
Perceiving F un ctions: Taking in information, “process management’20 
(N) iNtuiting: Focus on abstract contextual patterns
Ne (Extraverted iNtuiting): envisioning, enabling, entertaining21 
Ni (Introverted iNtuiting): knowing, imagining, divining22 
(S) Sensing: Focus on sensory data
Se (Extraverted Sensing): experiencing, engaging, enjoying23 
Si (Introverted Sensing): verifying, implementing, accounting24 
Judging F u n ction s: Organizing and sorting information, “decision making’25 
(T) Thinking: Organize according to logical or “objective” criteria 
Te (Extraverted Thinking): planning, enforcing, regulating26 
Ti (Introverted Thinking): defining, naming, understanding27
20 Ibid., 51-2.
21 John Beebe, “The Battle Within: How Interactions Between Our Archetypes and Our 
Functions Affect Us,” unpublished lecture, August 4-7, 2010, Berea, OH.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Nardi, Neuroscience of Personality: Brain Savvy Insights, 51.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
(F) Feeling: Organize according to criteria of individual or social value 
Fe (Extraverted Feeling): affirming, validating, relating28 
Fi (Introverted Feeling): appraising, judging, valuating29 
Extraversión: perception, judgment processed “as if” unmediated30 
Introversion: perception, judgment processed “as if” mediated31
Typical h ierarchy o f  functions: balance of perceiving/judging, extra-/intro- 
version in primary and secondary functions (Examples: NiTe, SeFi, TiFe, FeNi)
Figure 1: Jung’s Eight Cognitive Functions
Figure 1 displays the binarisms most commonly discussed in the Jungian typologi­
cal literature. The top half of the figure displays the four “perceiving” functions 
of Intuiting (N) and Sensing (S) in their extraverted and introverted “attitudes’; 
these functions are called perceiving functions because they are concerned with 
differences in how individuals prefer to take in information — or, as Nardi puts it, 
with “process management.”32 These two functional pairs are differentiated with 
respect to whether one tends to focus on the sensory data itself (S) or the more 
abstract contextual patterns that they form (N).
By contrast, the second half of Figure 1 displays the four “judging” functions of 
Thinking (T) and Feeling (F); judging functions are concerned with differences in 
how individuals prefer to organize and sort that information — or, as Nardi puts 
it, with “decision-making.”33 These two functional pairs are differentiated with 
respect to whether one tends to organize according to logical or “objective” criteria 
(T) or according to criteria of individual or social value (F).
The so-called extraverted and introverted “attitudes” into which each category 
is divided (as symbolized by small-case “e” and “i,” respectively), differ according 
the degree to which perception or judgment is approached in a relatively unmedi­
ated or mediated fashion. In other words, some cognitive functions appear phe- 
nomenologically to the subj ect (1) “as if” information were simply being recorded, 
“played back,” and interacted with in ways that could be shared by others, or (2) 
“as if ’ unique to the subject and filtered through their consciousness in such a way 
as to imply a separation.34
Finally, Classical Jungian theory hypothesizes that the most effective pairing of 
preferred functions in an individual should be those that feature a balance between
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Kenneth Joel Shapiro, Irving E. Alexander, The Experience of Introversion: An Integra­
tion of Phenomenological, Empirical, and Jungian Approaches (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1975).
31 Ibid.
32 Nardi, Neuroscience of Personality: Brain Savvy Insights, 51-2.
33 Ibid.
34 Shapiro, Alexander, The Experience of Introversion, 119-30.
perception and judgment, and between extraverted and introverted attitudes, 
since each of these categories is necessary for effective cogitation. Indeed, Nardi’s 
EEG research suggests that such a pairing is statistically quite common. Typical 
functional pairings thus tend to correspond to this principle; for example, one 
might find Ni (an introverted perceiving function) as a primary function paired 
with Te (an extraverted judging function) as a secondary function. Nevertheless, 
other preferred pairings are possible, and contextual factors might require any 
combination of functions, no matter how familiar or comfortable to the subject.
Table 1 features a partial listing of interpretive binarisms that arise from Jun- 
gian cognitive functions and their combinations, and the research communities 
and individuals that have engaged with it — including some to which I have al­
ready alluded (Berens and Nardi) and others that I have not (John Lopker and 
John Beebe). In the present context I do not intend to discuss the implications of 
this table in full, nor will I discuss all of the binarisms contained herein. Instead,
I wish to provide some sense of the richness and complexity of this model as a tool 
for discourse analysis and to show how the functions we have described fit into 
that model.
As an analytical model for narrative discourse analysis, these binarisms offer 
a productive way forward. Not every dichotomy will apply to every case or com­
parison, because the constellation of preferred functions differs from individual 
to individual, but to the degree that a binary opposition is salient, an individual is 
likely to prefer one term of that opposition over another — especially if it engages 
a strongly-preferred function.
Table 1: Cognitive Binarisms (bold entries discussed in text)
# First Term Second Term Source JungianBasis
1 Unbounded Pattern Articulation
Bounded Pattern 
Articulation Ne vs. Ni
2 Experiential Perception Comparative Perception Beebe(2010) Se vs. Si
3 Affirming Valuation Appraising Valuation Beebe
(2010)
Fe vs. Fi
4 EstablishedSystematizing
Idiosyncratic
Systematizing Te vs. Ti
5
Concrete Language
Usage
(Content)
Abstract Language
Usage
(Context)
Berens
(2006) Se, Si vs. Ne, Ni
6 Pragmatic Criteria (Separating)
Affiliative Criteria 
(Uniting)
Berens
(2006)
Se, NiTe, NeTi 
vs. Si, NiFe, NeFi
7 Focus on Motive Focus on Structure Berens(2006)
Se, NiFe, NeFi 
vs. Si, NiTe, NeTi
# First Term Second Term Source JungianBasis
8
Unmediated 
Engagement 
(Low stim.: brain idle)
Mediated Engagement 
(Low stim.: brain 
active)
Shapiro
(1975)
(Nardi
[2008])
Se, Ne, Te, Fe vs. 
Si, Ni, Ti, Fi
9 DirectingCommunication
Informing
Communication
Berens
(2008)
SeTi, SiTe, Ni 
vs. SeFi, SiFe, Ne
10 Focus on Outcome Focus on Process
Berens
(2008)
SeTi, SiFe, FeNi, 
TiNe, Fi, Te 
vs. SeFi, FeSi, TiSe, 
SiTe, Ne, Ni
11 Judgment Function (Decision Making)
Perception Function 
(Process Management)
Nardi
(2010)
Te, Ti, Fe, Fi vs. 
Se, Si, Ne, Ni
12
*
Objective Judgment Value Judgment
Lopker
(2000) Te, Ti vs. Fe, Fi
13 Open Perception Close Perception
Lopker
(2000)
Se, Si vs. Ne, Ni
14 Attention to the Actual
Attention to the 
Novel
Lopker
(2000) Se vs. Ne
15
Seeking Continuation 
(Past Orientation)
Seeking Anticipation 
(Future Orientation)
Lopker
(2000) Si vs. Ni
16 Confining Decisions Refining Decisions
Lopker
(2000) Te, Fe vs. Ti, Fi
17 Employing Methods (Causation)
Employing Customs 
(Relations)
Lopker
(2000) Te vs. Fe
18 Categorizing with Ideas Categorizing with Ideals
Lopker
(2000) Ti vs. Fi
19 Global Variability Emphasis on Variation
Local Variability 
Emphasis on Themes
Lopker
(2000)
Se, Ne + Ti, Fi vs. 
Si, Ni + Te, Fe
Using these oppositions as lenses, we can observe quite distinct interpretive 
profiles in the music-narrative community. For example, we might contrast my own 
approach with that of my colleague Robert S. Hatten, author of many hermeneutic 
and narrative studies including the 2004 book Interpreting Musical Gestures, 
Topics, and Tropes. I would propose that my work shares with Hatten’s work 
a pronounced focus on bounded pattern articulation (Row 1); indeed, Hatten’s 
entire corpus of writings is concerned with reframing our approach to interpre­
tation along particular structural and hermeneutic lines. However, I would also 
suggest that we differ with respect to Row 17, summarized there as “method” vs. 
“custom.” Hatten’s research seems primarily directed toward achieving a greater 
degree of terminological precision and richness in the service of a robust analytical 
method. By contrast, my categories — however similar in character or disciplinary
origin — are primarily harnessed for a different end: to harmonize and to create 
space for disparate interpretive approaches through the precise articulation of 
their differences.
As another example, consider the scholars Edward Pearsall and Susan McClary. 
Their respective research outputs reveal certain common features; for example, 
both reveal a preference for “appraising valuation” (Row 4). That is to say, their 
work is frequently positioned as a vigorous defense of what they value — and 
therefore what we should consider valuing — in musical discourse. On the other 
hand, they appear to differ with respect to Row 14, summarized there as “attention 
to the actual” and “attention to the novel.” In Pearsall’s writing — such as his essay 
“Anti-Teleological Art: Articulating Meaning through Silence”35 — he is concerned 
with calling our attention to perceptual features that we might not have noticed. 
McClary’s work, by contrast, displays emergent patterns that shock us out of our 
customary frameworks.
In the present context, I have only been able to hint at the possibilities of this 
differential approach to narrative discourse analysis. But I hope to have suggested 
that we create a troublesome blind spot when we focus entirely on the analytical 
object when practicing narrative interpretation. It is an ironic truth that to under­
stand the work of art, the interpreter must turn the lens upon him — or herself. 
To understand the teleology of the sign system, we must understand the teleology 
of the sign user.
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